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1. Introduction 
 
Some retail markets, such us drugstores in many countries, have regulations with respect to 
entry into the market. Two popular ways of regulation are the concession of a number of 
licenses and a minimum distance between stores. This paper performs a comparative 
welfare analysis of these types of regulation in a model of competition in a linear market 
analysing the role of demand elasticity and the nature of the entry game: simultaneous or 
sequential.  
In many countries there are restrictions on opening a pharmacy. While licenses allow for a 
direct control on the number of drugstores in a city or region, the minimum distance rule 
softens competition since it prohibits a new pharmacy to open very close to an existing one 
and, at the same time, it ensures an even distribution of pharmacies across a city thus 
controlling the transportation costs that have to be travelled by consumers.  
This analysis is motivated by a regulatory change in the drugstore market of the Spanish 
region Navarre. While before 2001, the main restriction to entry into the drugstore market 
was a fixed number of licenses, in 2001, the conditions to obtain a license were 
significantly liberalized. As a consequence, in many parts of Navarre, from 2001 on, the 
minimum distance of 150 metres between drugstores became the binding restriction to 
open a new store.  
The linear market describes competition between products horizontally differentiated along 
a single dimension. Hotelling (1929) pioneered the analysis of competition with 
horizontally differentiated products and predicted minimum product differentiation in 
equilibrium. Some of the original Hotelling assumptions have been relaxed by posterior 
works showing a tendency towards maximum or, at least, intermediate degree of 
differentiation.1 One assumption of the original Hotelling model, which has important 
consequences for the equilibrium, is that all consumers buy one unit of the good, so 
demand is completely inelastic. This assumption has been tackled in two ways. One way is 
to assume that demand is price inelastic up to a reservation price, such that each consumer 
will purchase one unit of the good if the delivered price (price plus transportation cost) is 
lower than reservation price.2 The second approach is to consider that demand is elastic at 
                                                 
1 A noteworthy contribution is that by d’Aspremont et al. (1979) who find a subgame perfect equilibrium with 
maximum product differentiation considering quadratic, rather than linear, transportation costs.  
 
2 This approach was first used by Lerner and Singer (1937) who showed that the minimum differentiation 
result implied by Hotelling (1929) did not necessarily hold. Two more recent works by Economides (1984) 
 
 
5
every point of the demand curve, so that the quantity demanded is a continuous and 
decreasing function of price.3 In this paper we analyse elasticity of demand under the 
former approach. 
The present paper analyses a modified version of Hotelling’s model by considering 
minimum distance conditions and sequential entry into a market with two firms, in addition 
to elastic demand. The literature on sequential entry in a linear market has focused mainly 
on the prediction of the equilibrium locations of firms by comparing the case of a fixed 
number of firms with the one that considers free entry and fosters entry deterrence 
strategies. One of the goals of those works is to analyse whether all earlier entrants get a 
higher profit than later ones.4 The number of firms in equilibrium with free entry is 
typically determined by entry deterrence strategies in combination with the level of fixed 
costs (Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Lane, 1980; Neven, 1987; Economides et al., 2004).5  
In our model the location of the firms in equilibrium depends on the combination of entry 
deterrence activities of incumbent firms with the minimum distance fixed by the regulator. 
We show that minimum distance rules may reach a higher level of both consumer and 
social surplus than number of licenses rules when demand is sufficiently inelastic. The 
optimal distance rule is a quarter of the market, which is beneficial for consumers when the 
reservation value is above some threshold level. The market configuration is also optimal 
when price is regulated.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we briefly present the 
model of horizontal product differentiation and the way we analyse welfare. In Section 3, 
we perform the analysis of regulation through number of licenses under simultaneous entry 
of firms. In Section 4, we analyse entry with regulation through number of licenses and 
through minimum distance in the case of sequential entry. Section 5 analyses the optimal 
minimum distance rule when prices are regulated. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
and Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999) study the existence of equilibria in the two-stage game where firms 
choose locations in the first stage and set prices in the second. 
3 This approach was introduced by Smithies (1941) who showed that duopolists in equilibrium located 
between the centre of the market and the quartiles. Rath and Zhao (2001) modify the model in Smithies 
(1941) by using a quadratic, rather than a linear, transportation cost, finding that a Nash equilibrium in prices 
exists for each possible pair of locations. 
4 Which follows the literature on first mover advantages, see Gal-Or (1985). Other works that analyse the 
earlier entrant advantages are Anderson (1987), analysing sequential moves in both location and price, 
Lambertini (2002), who considers an infinite time horizon, and Fleckinger and Lafay (2010), who consider 
sequential moves in a market where firms choose at the same time location and price. 
5 Götz (2005) analyses a modified version of Neven (1987) by considering changes in market size for given 
levels of fixed costs. 
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2. The Model 
 
In this section, we present a modified version of Hotelling’s original model in which 
transportation costs are quadratic in distance, as in d’Aspremont et al. (1979) and Neven 
(1985), which allow us to reach a subgame perfect equilibrium. Consumers are evenly 
distributed along a linear city of length 1 where there are two firms located at 1x  (firm 1) 
and 2x  (firm 2), with 10 21  xx . 
The utility of a consumer located at point   when she buys from firm j , located at jx , is: 
   2,   jjjj xpkpxu , 
where 0k  is her reservation price, which is assumed to be equal for all consumers, and 
 2,1j . When entry is simultaneous, the game is played in two stages: in the first stage 
firms simultaneously choose locations and, in the second stage, firms simultaneously set 
prices. When entry is sequential, the game is played in three stages: in the first stage firm 1 
chooses its location, in the second stage firm 2 chooses its location and in the third stage 
both firms simultaneously set prices. 
The game is solved by backward induction. From the condition of the marginal consumer, 
who is indifferent between buying from firm 1 or 2, we get the equilibrium prices  xp j  
and demands  xD j  as a function of the vector of locations x : 
(1)      
3
2 2112
1
xxxxxp  , 
(2)      
3
4 2112
2
xxxxxp  , 
(3)   
6
2 21
1
xxxD  , 
(4)   
6
4 21
2
xxxD  . 
Note that, when the firms change their location, there are two countervailing effects: a price 
effect (such as price decreases as firms get closer to each other) and a market share effect 
(as demands increase when the firms move towards the centre of the market). Equilibrium 
locations are computed depending on the nature of the entry game (simultaneous or 
sequential) and on the type of regulation (with restrictions, in the case of a minimum 
distance, or without, in the case of the concession of two licenses).  
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In order to complete the welfare analysis of each type of regulation analysed in the 
following sections we need to define the consumer surplus loss.  
The consumer surplus loss is associated with the transportation costs incurred by 
consumers. The consumer surplus loss (CSL ) is defined as 
 
 

21 21 1
0
2
0 0
22
0
2
xxz zxx
dssdssdssdssCSL , 
where z  is the location of the marginal consumer between 1x  and 2x .  
The maximum level of surplus that could be reached in this market is equal to the 
reservation value k . That area of value k  is divided into three components: profits, 
consumer surplus and consumer surplus loss. Therefore consumer surplus (CS ) is equal to 
CSLkCS  , where   is the sum of firms’ profits, and social surplus ( SS ) is defined 
as CSLkCSSS  . 
 
3. Simultaneous entry 
 
In this section, we consider the case where the regulator concedes two licenses and the 
license holders enter the market simultaneously. We omit the analysis of simultaneous 
entry with minimum distance as, if two firms take the decision of entering the market at the 
very same time, they could violate the minimum distance condition. 
Therefore, the two firms which obtained a license simultaneously choose locations in order 
to maximise their first-stage profit functions without restrictions, given the second-stage 
prices and demands in equations (1) to (4). Profit functions are:  
    
12
2 22112
1
xxxxx   and     
12
4 22112
2
xxxxx  . 
Let us now introduce the role of elasticity of demand. We analyse it by considering 
different realisations of the reservation value k : When 25.145 k , all consumers buy 
one unit of the good for any non-cooperative configuration of locations and prices, so the 
demand is completely inelastic. The corresponding maximisations of the profit functions 
with respect to 1x  and 2x  yield equilibrium locations 01 x  and 12 x . This is the 
maximum product differentiation solution of d’Aspremont et al. (1979). Prices are 
121  pp  and demands are 5.021  DD . When 25.1k , the solution of maximum 
product differentiation may imply that some consumers located close to the market centre 
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would not buy the good. The firms increase their profits by locating closer to the market 
centre and charging lower prices to ensure full coverage. Table 1 shows the equilibrium 
values of locations, prices and demands for the different ranges of the reservation value k  
and Table 2 shows the equilibrium profits and surpluses for the same ranges of k . We 
observe that, when demand becomes very elastic ( 1875.0163 k ) there is no full 
coverage, as some consumers do not purchase the good, and there is multiplicity of 
equilibria. 
k  x1  x2 p1 p2 D1  D2
ሾ54 ,∞ሻ  0  1  1  1 
1
2 
1
2 
ሾ 916 ,
5
4ሻ 
3
2 െ √1 ൅ ݇  െ
1
2 ൅ √1 ൅ ݇ 
2൫√1 ൅ ݇
െ 1൯ 
2ሺ√1 ൅ ݇
െ 1ሻ 
1
2 
1
2 
ሾ 316 ,
9
16ሻ 
1
4 
3
4  ݇ െ
1
16  ݇ െ
1
16 
1
2 
1
2 
ሾ0, 316ሻ  ሾඨ
݇
3 ,
1
2 െ ඨ
݇
3ሿ  ሾ
1
2 ൅ ඨ
݇
3 , 1 െ ඨ
݇
3ሿ 
2
3݇ 
2
3݇  2ඨ
݇
3  2ඨ
݇
3 
Table 1: Equilibrium locations, prices and demands as a function of reservation price in the case of 
two licenses 
 
k  ∏1  ∏2  CS  SS 
ሾ54 ,∞ሻ 
1
2 
1
2  ݇ െ
13
12  ݇ െ
1
12 
ሾ 916 ,
5
4ሻ 
√1 ൅ ݇ െ 1  √1 ൅ ݇ െ 1  1
2√1 ൅ ݇ െ
7
12 
5
2√1 ൅ ݇ െ
31
12 
ሾ 316 ,
9
16ሻ 
݇
2 െ
1
32 
݇
2 െ
1
32 
1
24  ݇ െ
1
48 
ሾ0, 316ሻ  43 ݇ඨ
݇
3 
4
3 ݇ඨ
݇
3 
݇
3 െ
4
9 ݇ඨ
݇
3  ݇ െ
4
9 ݇ඨ
݇
3 
Table 2: Equilibrium profits, consumer surplus and social surplus as a function of reservation price 
in the case of two licenses 
 
Figure 1 depicts the locations, prices, demands and profits of the firms for different values 
of the reservation price and the level of consumer and social surplus. The horizontal axis 
represents the reservation price which is decreasing from left to right. The blue line 
represents the values for firm 1, while the red line represents the values for firm 2. In the 
simultaneous entry case, as firms behave symmetrically, they only differ in locations, while 
the prices, sales and profits are equal for both firms. Therefore, in the last three graphs, the 
blue line is shadowed by the red line. 
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Figure 1: Firms’ locations, prices, demands and profits as a function of reservation price in the case 
of two licenses 
 
In this model we get the result that, when the reservation price is between 0.1875 and 1.25, 
the equilibrium corresponds to the touching equilibrium found by Economides (1984) 
where the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying from either firm is also 
indifferent between buying the good or not, as she is extracted the whole surplus.  
 
4. Sequential entry 
 
In this section, we present the model of sequential entry into the market described in 
Section 2. In this case the game is played in three stages. In the first stage, the first entrant 
(firm 1) chooses its location; in the second stage, the second entrant (firm 2) chooses its 
location; and, in the third stage, firms simultaneously choose prices. The first entrant will 
therefore choose its location anticipating the location reaction of the second entrant.  
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For each range of the reservation value, we analyse the solutions under the two policies: 
first, when the regulator concedes two licenses and, second, when the regulator states a 
minimum distance rule. We will see that we reach different equilibria for different values 
of the minimum distance. We will also see that, when 5625.0169 k , the minimum 
distance rule benefits the consumers in detriment of the firms while this benefit disappears 
when 5625.0k . The minimum distance rule has another consequence: the multiplicity of 
equilibria only exists for very low values of the reservation price ( 046875.0643 k ). 
 
4.1.Case 1: 25.1k  
When the regulator concedes two licenses, we get the same solution as in Economides et 
al. (2004, p. 7). Firm 1 locates at the end of the market ( 01 x ) anticipating that firm 2 will 
locate at the other end of the market ( 12 x ). The second entrant does this in order to relax 
price competition as much as possible even though it would gain a higher market share if it 
located closer to the first entrant. This happens as, for this range of the reservation value, 
the price effect dominates the market share effect. The price is equal to 1 and the consumer 
and social surpluses take the same values as in the case of simultaneous entry.  
For the case of minimum distance, define d >0 such that the distance between two stores 
has to be higher than d , so d  is non-inclusive. We focus on the range of values of 
minimum distance for which we have a duopoly in equilibrium: 5.025.0  d .6 Here, we 
have two relevant ranges of the minimum distance: between one-half and one-third and 
between one-third and one-quarter. Figure 2 depicts the locations, prices and demands of 
the firms for the different values of minimum distance for all the values of 25.1k .  
If the minimum distance between firms’ locations is some value between 31  and 21 , then 
firm 1 will take some location between 0 and 31 , always keeping a distance of d2  to firm 
2, and the latter will be located at 1. Firm 1 accepts the entry of one firm 2 but acts in order 
to deter the entry of an additional one in the segment between the two firms. Firm 2 will 
choose the farthest possible location, which is the edge of the market segment as, for these 
high values of the reservation price, the price effect dominates the market share effect. 
 
                                                 
6 For 5.0d , there is only one firm located in the market centre, and for 25.0d , there are more than two 
firms.  
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Figure 2: Firms’ locations, prices and demands as a function of the minimum distance when 
reservation price is 25.1k  
 
When the minimum distance is between 41  and 31 , entry is not blocked if firm 2 remains 
at the edge. So it has to move towards the middle of the market segment. Firm 1 will move 
towards its end in order to be farthest from firm 2 still avoiding the entry of an additional 
firm as the distance between firm 1 and its closer end is d  and the distance between the 
two firms is d2 . 
The evolution of the prices and demands show that there are first mover advantages, as 
some of the literature on sequential entry had predicted, because the first entrant (firm 1) 
enjoys a higher price and a higher demand than the second entrant (firm 2). 
Comparison of policies: For every value of d , in the range [0.25,0.5), the firms’ profit is 
higher under the license rule and both consumer and social surplus are higher under the 
minimum distance rule. The highest social surplus is reached when minimum distance is 
41  with firms located at the quartiles. We can see the equilibrium profits and surpluses 
under the license rule, indicated by (l), and under the minimum distance rule, indicated by 
(d), for the different levels of minimum distance analysed for 5.1k  (Figure 3) and for 
25.1k (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3: Firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social surplus under the license rule (l) and under 
the minimum distance rule (d) when 5.1k  
 
 
Figure 4: Firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social surplus under the license rule (l) and under 
the minimum distance rule (d) when 25.1k  
 
4.2.Case 2: 25.15625.0  k  
When the regulator concedes two licenses, the two firms follow the same behaviour as in 
the simultaneous entry case of Chapter 3. 
For the case of minimum distance, there are three relevant ranges: 
- Minimum distance in the range ሾ√1 ൅ ݇ െ 1, 1 2⁄ ሻ 
In this case, the equilibrium is the same as in the case of two licenses. 
- Minimum distance in the range ሾെ1 6⁄ ൅ 1 3⁄ √1 ൅ ݇, √1 ൅ ݇ െ 1ሻ 
In this case, firm 2 remains at the same location as in the previous range but firm 1 locates 
closer to its rival in order not to allow the entry of an additional competitor. The distance 
between both firms is d2 .  
- Minimum distance in the range  ሾ1 4⁄ , െ 1 6⁄ ൅ 1 3⁄ √1 ൅ ݇൯ 
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In this case, entry is not blocked if firm 2 remains at the previous location. It thus locates 
closer to the market centre at a location dx 32  . Firm 1 keeps a distance of d2  between 
the two firms.  
 
 
Figure 5: Firms’ locations, prices and demands as a function of the minimum distance when 
reservation price is 1k  
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Figure 6: Firms’ locations, prices and demands as a function of the minimum distance when 
reservation price is 75.0k  
 
Here we still have first mover advantages but they are smaller and take place for a lower 
range of the reservation price as that value decreases. 
Comparison of policies: For every value of d  in the range [0.25,0.5), the firms’ profit is 
again higher under the license rule and the consumer and social surpluses are higher under 
the minimum distance rule. The highest social surplus is reached when minimum distance 
is 41  with firms located at the quartiles. We can observe the equilibrium profits and 
surpluses under the two rules for 1k  (Figure 7) and for 75.0k (Figure 8). 
  
Figure 7: Firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social surplus under the license rule (l) and under 
the minimum distance rule (d) when 1k  
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Figure 8: Firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social surplus under the license rule (l) and under 
the minimum distance rule (d) when 75.0k  
 
4.3. Case 3: 5625.01875.0  k  
When the regulator concedes two licenses, the locations and prices are the same functions 
of the reservation value as in the simultaneous entry case, so are the profits and surpluses. 
In this case, the relevant feature of the minimum distance rule is that, when minimum 
distance is higher than 0.25, the firms will choose the quartiles, so with each minimum 
distance lower than 0.5 the firms will always choose the quartiles in order to avoid further 
entry, so they choose the same locations as with two licenses. Even though the locations are 
the same for all the range of reservation price, prices are reduced when demand becomes 
more elastic in order to have all consumers purchasing the good.  
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Figure 9: Firms’ locations, prices and demands as a function of the minimum distance when 
reservation price is 5.0k  
 
In Figures 9 and 10, we see locations, prices and demands for 5.0k  and 25.0k  
respectively. In both cases firms are located in the quartiles and each firm gets 50% of the 
market. Prices decrease in k  and are the same for both firms, so there are no first mover 
advantages. 
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Figure 10: Firms’ locations, prices and demands as a function of the minimum distance when 
reservation price is 25.0k  
 
When we perform the comparison of policies for this range of k  we see that the minimum 
distance rule provides the same welfare as the license rule, so no group benefits nor is hurt 
by the change of rules. We can see this in Figures 11 and 12. 
 
Figure 11: Firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social surplus when 5.0k  
  
Figure 12: Firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social surplus when 25.0k  
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4.4. Case 4: 1875.0046875.0  k  
In this case, demand is too elastic for firms to serve the entire market. When the regulator 
concedes two licenses, the locations and prices are the same functions of the reservation 
value as in the simultaneous entry case, so are the profits and surpluses, and we have 
multiplicity of equilibria. With the minimum distance rule, the multiplicity of equilibria 
disappears as firms locate at the quartiles in order to avoid the entry of additional firms.  
  
 
Figure 13: Firms’ locations, prices and demands as a function of the minimum distance when 
reservation price is 125.0k  
 
In Figure 13, we see the equilibrium locations, prices and demands as a function of the 
minimum distance for 125.0k . Prices keep decreasing and the demands of both firms 
are now lower than 0.5. Again there are no first mover advantages. 
When we perform the comparison of policies for this range of k , we get the same level of 
profits, consumer surplus and social surplus under both types of regulation. The main 
change between the two policies is that the consumers under one rule may not be the same 
as under the other rule as, under the minimum distance rule the consumers are the ones 
closer to the quartiles but, under the license rule (given that we have multiplicity of 
equilibria), the firm can serve any group of consumers between the edges and the centre. 
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4.5. Case 5: 046875.0k  
When 046875.0643 k , the firms cannot serve more than 1 4⁄  of the market so, under 
the minimum distance rule, they don’t mind to accept the entry of an additional firm as 
long as they keep the same demand and price as if they deter entry. For this range of the 
reservation value we have multiplicity of equilibria again. The optimal locations become 
the same as in the two license case: ݔଵ ∈ ሾඥ݇ 3⁄ , 1 2⁄ െ ඥ݇ 3⁄ ሿ and ݔଶ ∈ ሾ1 2⁄ ൅
ඥ݇ 3⁄ , 1 െ ඥ݇ 3⁄ ሿ. Comparing the policies, we have that the prices, demands and profits 
of firms 1 and 2 are the same under both policies but it may be the case that, under the 
minimum distance rule, more than two firms enter the market increasing the overall level of 
profits, the consumer surplus and the social surplus. 
 
4.6. Profitability of entry deterrence 
Let us now show that it is more profitable for the two firms to avoid the entry of an 
additional firm rather than to allow entrance and to accommodate to the existence of a third 
firm. Without loss of generality, we show this for the case where 25.1k . 
If the firms act in order to deter entry satisfying the minimum distance condition, they get 
outputs, prices and profits as exhibited in Table 3. 
 
Firm number Location Price Output Profits 
1 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.25 
2 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 
TOTAL       0.5 
Table 3: Equilibrium results for 25.1k with minimum distance and entry deterrence 
 
If the two incumbent firms accommodate to the entry of a third firm, Economides et al. 
(2004) show the equilibrium summarised in Table 4, where the firm number corresponds to 
the order of entry. 
 
Firm number Location Price Output Profits 
1 0.58 0.1972 0.4750 0.0935 
2 0.09 0.2627 0.2681 0.0704 
3 0.94 0.1850 0.2569 0.0475 
TOTAL       0.2116 
 Table 4: Equilibrium results for 25.1k for three firms under sequential entry 
 
Note that prices and profits decrease significantly with respect to the case with two firms. 
Therefore, firms 1 and 2 will act to avoid the entry of a third firm as described above. 
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5. Entry regulation with regulated prices 
 
In some sectors, such as prescription drugs, prices are regulated so that competition in 
prices does not take place. In these cases firms only choose locations. In the equilibrium 
without distance restrictions, both firms would locate at the centre of the market segment 
(see Eaton and Lipsey, 1975, p. 30), where the average distance travelled by consumers is 
41 . If the regulator tried to maximise social welfare, by minimising the average distance 
travelled by consumers, it would locate the stores at the quartiles ( 75.0,25.0 21  xx ), 
where the average distance travelled is 81  (see Church and Ware, 2000, p. 392). These 
locations are reached when minimum distance is 5.0d . If 1875.0k , the highest 
optimal regulated price is 161 kp . If 1875.0k , then the optimal regulated price is 
32kp  . 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this work, we have performed a comparative welfare analysis for two types of entry 
regulation in a duopolistic linear market: number of licenses and minimum distance. We 
have considered different ranges of the reservation price, therefore all consumers do not 
necessarily buy one unit of the good, so demand may be price-elastic.  
With two licenses, firms choose the same location both under simultaneous entry and 
sequential entry. When demand is completely inelastic, firms are located at the edges of the 
market and all consumers purchase one unit of the good. As demand becomes more elastic, 
firms locate closer to the market centre and charge lower prices. 
When locations are regulated through minimum distance and entry is sequential, firms 
choose their locations in order to avoid the entry of an additional firm. When demand is 
sufficiently inelastic, firms locate closer to the market centre than with two licenses. Prices 
decrease and both consumer and social surpluses increase. When the reservation price 
reaches the level of 9 16⁄ , firms choose the quartiles under both policies so the surplus of 
each group is the same. The optimal rule is a minimum distance of 41 , with which firms 
will be located at the quartiles. This rule benefits the consumers when the reservation value 
is above the mentioned level.  
When prices are regulated, so that firms only compete in locations, the optimal minimum 
distance rule is 21  with firms located at the quartiles again. 
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The result about the multiplicity of equilibria when the demand is very elastic and there is 
no full coverage may deserve some discussion. In the case of two licenses the multiplicity 
of equilibria exists for more levels of reservation price than with minimum distance. In this 
work, all consumers are homogeneous in terms of valuation of the good and transportation 
cost and consumers are uniformly distributed along the market. There is also no fixed cost 
of entry. As a consequence of these assumptions, there are no welfare differences across 
the different policies when there is no full coverage. In many cities, town centres are 
usually more populated than the suburbs, so they attract more shops but, at the same time, 
the fixed cost of entry is higher as the real estate prices increase with the density of 
population. With minimum distance, earlier entrants may prefer to establish in the more 
populated areas than to choose the locations that deter entry. However, this analysis is left 
for future research. 
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